

BRIEFING ON THE WORLD SITUATION

JANUARY 11, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright (presiding), and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Morse, Lausche, Symington, Church, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt and Mr. Tillman of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

This is an executive session, as everyone knows. We are very pleased and honored this morning to have the Secretary of State to come and give us a briefing here early in the session. He will talk about matters of great interest to this committee. Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. It is a very great privilege for me to be before the committee again. May I say at the beginning that my last visit with the committee was on September 17. A great deal has happened since that date, and we do, I think, have a problem of time in order to get into the many important things that have transpired in the last three and a half months.

I would hope today if it is agreeable with the committee, to talk about three or four of the most urgent and major developments and then if the committee is willing to let me come back for a number of things that we may not have time for, because we do have a formidable problem, I think, of covering a great many developments.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, I am sure that is what the committee would be interested in doing.

Secretary Rusk. It is also possible, Mr. Chairman, that the committee or one of its subcommittees would want to go into greater detail on one or more of these questions in another kind of session with all of the documentation made available for the committee, but that is something the committee might wish to consider.

OFFENSIVE MISSILES IN CUBA

I last met with the committee in September and we were then talking about Cuba. In the middle of September it was our estimate that the military buildup on that island was consistent with a defensive configuration of its military establishment. There had been issued by the President on September 4th and 13th two press conference statements making it, we thought, simply and solemnly clear, that if Cuba were to be transformed into an offensive base by the Soviet Union, or if ground-to-ground missiles, for example, were to be established there, that the gravest possible issues would arise.

Let me say to the committee quite frankly and in anticipation of a more detailed examination of the day-by-day and week-by-week events of that period, that the intelligence community, including us at the Department of State, did not expect the Soviet Union to put strategic nuclear missiles in Cuba. This, it turned out, was the first time they had done so. It was our estimate in mid-December they would not depart so far from their practice, they would not take the risks that were involved in such a move, and therefore, this political and intelligence judgment in the middle of December is something that—

Senator HUMPHREY. Middle of what?

Secretary RUSK. Middle of September, is something you gentlemen ought to know about and; of course, there are papers on this subject we will be glad to eat the present time, but it does, I think, have this bearing, that when casual rumors came in, that is from passersby or from refugees and that is not based upon hard pictorial or other information, I think there was a tendency for the analysts to measure these against what we did know about.

For example, the ground-to-air, anti aircraft missiles are considerably longer than this table, and when someone reported, "Well, we saw a whale of a big missile," there was a tendency at the beginning, I believe, to think this is consistent with what we know about this other business and, therefore, the examination of bits and pieces of evidence was against the background of a judgment that the Soviet Union would not be expected to move in this direction.

I point this out because this is a continuing problem for us all in government, in the interpretation of intelligence.

However, during the very end of September and early part of November, some information did come in which appeared to draw—

Senator SYMINGTON. September and November?

Secretary RUSK. September and October, excuse me, information did come in which did seem to point the finger quite specifically at two suspicious locations where some construction seemed to be going on, that was not consistent with what was expected in Cuba.

MESSAGE FROM KHRUSHCHEV

So that in early October two things happened: On the one side, the Soviets sent us an oral message from the highest authority, from Khrushchev himself, saying that there was not and would not be in Cuba any missiles capable of reaching the United States. The committee ought to know, if it does not already, that this was not

an argument on the basis of what was in the minds of the people owning the weapons, "My weapons are defensive, yours are offensive."

It was stated exactly in those terms that there are not and would not be in Cuba any missiles capable of reaching the United States.

Senator AIKEN. How did that message come?

Secretary RUSK. That came orally from a member of the Soviet Embassy.

Senator AIKEN. To whom?

Secretary RUSK. To a member of the Administration in a casual contact, but it was——

Senator AIKEN. I see.

Secretary RUSK. And then the Ambassador later repeated this more formally.

Senator AIKEN. Never in writing?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, never in writing.

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS

Now, at the same time that we were getting that message, we got other information and laid on over-flights to take a particular look at those particular locations.

On the night of October 14, late at night I got a telephone call showing that the read-out of these photographs showed the pattern of construction going on identical with the pattern of a four-pad MRBM site of the sort that we were familiar with in the Soviet Union.

Senator HUMPHREY. When did you talk to Gromyko or when did the President?

Secretary RUSK. That was on the following Thursday.

Senator HUMPHREY. In that same week?

Secretary RUSK. Of that same week, yes, sir. I will mention that in just a moment, Senator.

During the next four or five days, therefore, two things were happening. One is that we then intensified very heavily the complete air coverage of the island to find out what was the situation throughout the island, and secondly, we immediately laid on, beginning that night and early the next morning, a full examination of the alternative lines of action that were open to us in that situation we might have to take.

By Friday night or Saturday morning of that week the coverage of the entire island had been made. It indicated that as many as six MRBM sites were going into position and that two IRBM sites were under early stages of construction.

The two sites which were first picked up were perhaps in about a week or ten days stage of development. Some of the other sites were picked up from practically empty pasture into a later stage of development. But I think had we sent the same air cover, say, ten days earlier we might have picked up one or possible two of the sites. We would not have seen the other MRBM sites.

PRINCIPAL CONTINGENCIES

But let me say that the one contingency that was not seriously examined because it was obvious at the beginning that were not

really open to us was the contingency of doing nothing. It is the consequences to our alliances, to the whole position of the free world, to the security situation of this country which was such that that was not a contingency that was given a special task force kind of analysis and examination.

The principal contingencies that were looked at were first, the quarantine moving to full blockade; second, the possibility of an immediate and unannounced air strike on these installations themselves, or third, a full scale invasion of the island.

I would also like to say in face of some of the newspaper comment that has been made on these days, that no one in a responsible position was, I think, able to have a responsible judgment as to what ought to be done until the Saturday morning of that week—until the full information was available and until the groups working on the different contingencies had come in with a full examination, and pros and cons, the contingencies, the operational features and everything else involved.

On the Saturday the President returned from his trip to the West Coast we discussed the contingencies that night and developed the course of action which was announced on the Monday evening.

THE MOST DANGEROUS CONFRONTATION

Now, there were a number of things in our minds at that time that you gentlemen, I think, would be interested in knowing.

It has been apparent to all of us that this was the most serious and dangerous confrontation which has occurred since World War II. It is the first direct confrontation of U.S. and Soviet arms since the Soviet Union acquired a massive delivery capability for nuclear weapons in the years 1955, 1956 and 1957.

There was no doubt whatever about the gravity of the act taken by the Soviet Union of putting missiles into Cuba, and the gravity and potential danger of such actions we would have to take in return.

Second, we felt that the official confirmation of the information about these weapons in Cuba had to be accompanied simultaneously with an announced course of action about what to do about it. There were many reasons for that. It was perfectly obvious to us that there would be uncontrolled fury throughout this hemisphere when the presence of these missiles became known. That, if the information became available without the line of action announced at the same time, there would be a period of perhaps confusion and disarray within the alliances, and also and most important of all, a delay would have given the Soviet Union a chance to insert an ultimatum of some sort which would have greatly increased, in our judgment, the risk of war.

Further, we tried to deal with it as much as possible as a Western Hemisphere problem. We thought that by doing so we might reduce somewhat the probabilities that Moscow would retaliate in some other part of the world if we took action with respect to Cuba.

REASONS FOR NOT INVOLVING NATO

We, for that reason, did not attempt to make it a matter of formal NATO action, for example.

Also, we could not be sure in advance what the response of our NATO allies would be, because we have been consulting with them through the previous year about Cuba. They were inclined to look upon it more as a Western Hemisphere problem, something of our concern and not theirs, something that did not seem to them to bite in deeply into the commitments of NATO or the concerns of NATO.

It does them a little injustice, they were somewhat more serious than that but this was not seized by them as a major issue for NATO, as we had hoped they would be willing to.

Therefore, by treating it as a Western Hemisphere problem we thought that the question that went to NATO at a moment of great danger could be simpler for them to answer. Rather than go to them and say, "Do you agree that we should do this about Cuba," the question that they were confronted with was, "Do you in this situation of danger support the United States?" And we thought the second question was much easier to answer than the first question from their and our point of view.

A SOVIET MISCALCULATION

Further, it seemed to us that a very serious mistake, miscalculation, misjudgment, had been made in Moscow. I think we still must give very sober and very thoughtful reflection to how it was possible for that kind of miscalculation to occur, and what degree of risk Moscow thought they were running in this situation because it has a bearing on such further issues as Berlin, for example.

We thought, therefore, that it was important before events moved out of control to give the Soviet Union at least some opportunity to reverse this mistake while the situation was still manageable.

Therefore, I think the essential element in the President's October 22 speech to the Nation was that the quarantine which was imposed was an initial step. What in effect was done was to combine the three courses of action that I mentioned in sequence, the initial step would be the quarantine, and the additional steps would be taken, if necessary, but the initial step would give the Soviet Union a chance to correct its mistake.

What was in their minds? Certainly from a strict military point of view, the presence in Cuba of missiles of this character and of that number would have been a very significant military improvement in their situation. It would not, perhaps, have changed the over-all total capacity of the United States, for example, to destroy the Soviet Union. But nevertheless, had these pads all become operational and all become equipped with the missiles which are normally used from such pads, numbers could have gone up to something like 72 missiles within range of the United States, which is comparable to their present missile capacity from longer distance against the United States.

In other words, this would be a very significant military increment which itself might explain some of their readiness to take some risk.

But I think also in retrospect now it appears that part of what was in their minds was that Mr. Khrushchev was planning to come to the United Nations General Assembly at the end of November, early December, he had these missiles in readiness position. He would then find an opportunity to talk to Mr. Kennedy about Berlin. He would talk very insistently about Berlin and point to these missiles in Cuba. That might well be the scenario that he had in mind.

QUARANTINE CAME AS A SURPRISE TO THE SOVIETS

But, whatever was in their minds, we do believe that the application of the quarantine against Soviet vessels came as a surprise to the Soviets; that their timing was thrown off and that for a period their contingencies were thrown out of gear.

On Monday the 22nd, for example, Soviet diplomats at the U.N. were saying in the corridors there they thought the President might that evening impose a blockade on Cuba but not, of course, against Soviet vessels because that would mean war. And it was some two or three days before the official Soviet position in the U.N. caught up with the known and demonstrable facts of the situation in Cuba itself.

Now, by the end of the day of October 23, two or three things of some significance, I think, had happened.

In the first place, the Soviets themselves did not elect to launch a first nuclear strike. In retrospect that may appear to have been highly improbable. We did not think they would, but we could not know that they would not. So, that was, I think, one of the most significant of the immediate developments that they made that decision straightaway.

They made the decision to take it up in the United Nations. They also immediately turned around six or seven of their own vessels coming toward Cuba in which we were especially interested. Having found the missiles, we looked for the vessels that would be bringing in more or in support of the missile force and identified seven vessels that looked as though they might be engaged in this particular operation. We were quite interested that apparently the vessels were picked out, because immediately those particular vessels were turned around.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOT LOCATED IN CUBA

We were intrigued by the fact that we never found a nose cone, never found an identifiable nuclear weapon in Cuba. We have to assume that they were there, but they are not too difficult to conceal, maybe five or six feet long.

We never, however, actually identified them. It is possible that the quarantine intercepted the later shipments of this total effort, and that this might have included the nose cone, but we just don't know. We never found them.

We never saw a missile actually raised on its launcher. Had we found a missile on its launcher, with nose cones in the vicinity,

then I think the development of events would have taken quite a different course than in fact they did.

MISSILES IN TURKEY

Now, during that week, there were several exchanges. There was a private letter from Mr. Khrushchev on October 26, the existence of which has been referred to in the press. I would be glad, Mr. Chairman, to show that letter to the committee if the committee wishes to get into a detailed examination of these events on a day-to-day basis.

It appeared to be a letter which was written by Mr. Khrushchev in person. We gather from what they have said to us since then, that it was written and sent by him personally without general clearance topside in the Soviet Union. It showed some sense of agitation, and it showed that he seemed to be disturbed about trying to find a way to get out of this particular situation.

But then there came the public letter of October 27 which raised the issue of American bases in NATO, pinpointing Turkey but also referring to Italy and Britain and other places where missiles had been present and were present.

We don't know exactly why he put that out on the 27th. It is possible that he thought that Mr. Kreisky's¹ speech in Austria had been somewhat inspired on our side. He might have thought perhaps the Walter Lippmann article on our side was inspired, neither of which was true.

Senator HUMPHREY. What was that?

Secretary RUSK. It had to do with the missiles in Turkey, the Lippmann article. It may be, I think it is very likely, that he did know we have been discussing in NATO for sometime the re-evaluation of missile deployment, the handling of the MRBM situation, and that both Turkey and Italy had themselves been discussing with us the question of the Jupiters. It may be that they had put away somewhere a leak on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee's report which appeared in our press sometime ago expressing considerable unhappiness about certain aspects of the Jupiter deployment.

But in any event there was a White House statement immediately on this same day which said that these missiles in the NATO area are a NATO problem. They cannot be linked to the Cuban problem, and that this is not a matter which can be handled on that basis.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I get one thing clear?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did you say that the statement in the Lippmann article was wrong, was incorrect?

Secretary RUSK. The Lippmann article did not purport to be an article on the facts. It was a think piece saying why not the Turkish missiles, you see.

Senator SPARKMAN. It was in some article, I thought it was in his article, that I read which said this had already been under discussion and more or less agreed to.

¹ Austrian Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky.

Secretary RUSK. I don't remember that particular fact. As a matter of fact, the subject had been discussed with the two governments. One of the problems for these two governments has been that when the Jupiters were offered to NATO, the Turks and the Italians accepted them and then found they were the only ones in the alliance who had accepted them and this created some problem at home. I had a very sharp approach on this from a Turkish diplomat at the recent meeting in NATO who expressed rather strong feeling about the sense that the rest of the alliance had let Turkey and Italy down by not coming into this business the way Turkey and Italy had.

Senator SPARKMAN. Italy took the Jupiters.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, both of them.

Senator SPARKMAN. I thought you said Greece and Turkey.

Secretary RUSK. No, Norway and Greece turned them down.

MISSILES IN A READINESS POSITION

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like some enlightenment. Mr. Secretary, you said if we had found a nuclear warhead you thought things would be considerably different. What did you mean by that?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, it is always a little dangerous to say what a decision would have been when, in fact, the occasion for the decision was not made. But I would say, it certainly was our clear thinking at the time if we saw these missiles in a readiness position we would have to strike them.

Senator HUMPHREY. If they were raised for launching?

Secretary RUSK. Raised and ready they would have to be hit.

Senator SYMINGTON. I wanted to be sure I understood. You weren't talking about finding them on ships coming in, but seeing the warhead on the missile itself, is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, that is correct.

RELATING MISSILES IN CUBA AND TURKEY

Senator LAUSCHE. Before he passes on, what did Lippmann suggest or what was the substance of that article?

Secretary RUSK. The article seemed to acknowledge that there was some reciprocal problem here. That the missiles in Cuba ought to be looked at in relation to our missiles in Turkey.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that is what Khrushchev argued?

Secretary RUSK. That is right. But from our point of view the missiles in Turkey are related to missiles in the Soviet Union. Now, whether we use Polaris or Minuteman or something else, that is a weapons problem. But it is not a matter which can be dealt with outside of the NATO framework and its confrontation with the Soviet Union and that was the purport of the President's answer.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why would Khrushchev think that the Lippmann article was leaked out by the State Department?

Secretary RUSK. I was speculating about why after the letter of October 26 he immediately put out this public letter of the 27th. It is just possible by that time he had heard of Kreisky's speech in Austria, he had heard of Lippmann's article. He had been remind-

ed there had been some discussion of these Jupiters before and he might have felt that maybe there was a chance to do something about this.

Senator HUMPHREY. Kreisky's speech in Australia?

Secretary RUSK. Austria.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. You see it is just possible, I mean there was no truth in it at all, but it was just possible that looked at from their point of view they might have wondered whether either Kreisky or Lippmann—

Senator HUMPHREY. Kreisky had been here just before.

Secretary RUSK. I am not certain how long it had been.

Senator HUMPHREY. It wasn't so long before.

Secretary RUSK. But he had been here months before. But, you see, they tend to identify key newspapers and key reporters as somehow speaking for the Administration much more than the facts support.

Senator HUMPHREY. They are not so far off at times.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is no feeling here. [Laughter.]

BALANCING OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT

Senator MORSE. Just one quick observation on this Lippmann article. It has always been my understanding that we take the position and, I think rightly, that the missiles in Turkey involve a balancing of the NATO Pact against the Warsaw Pact and Khrushchev's attempt would seem to be to weaken the NATO Pact by getting himself in a position in Cuba where he would sort of single out the United States for an attack and NATO couldn't be of immediate assistance to us.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator MORSE. But at the present time Warsaw and NATO pretty well contain themselves.

Secretary RUSK. I think there is a weapons problem in terms of what you ought to do from our side in terms of the most modern capabilities. These weapons are relatively obsolete. They are first strike weapons, they are exposed, and there are better weapons than those available, and there is a weapons problem on our side without relation to this political exchange with the Soviet Union which had to be rejected for the most obvious reasons.

KENNEDY'S RESPONSE TO KHRUSHCHEV

The President then, on October 27, issued his public letter to Khrushchev. We deliberately elected to base that on the October 26 letter although it had not been made public rather than the Turkish letter of October 27, because there was more of an opportunity in the October 26 letter to find out what, in fact, the Soviets were ready to do.

That was responded to by public letter of Khrushchev on October 28, which opened the way for the removal of the offensive weapons from Cuba.

I might say that one of the real problems that came out of this Cuban crisis that we and our NATO allies particularly will have to give a lot of attention to, is in effect the problem of crisis manage-

ment, how to keep abreast of events or, if possible, ahead of them in a very fast-moving situation and this applies even to the physical capacities of communication.

The public communications that were used on the 27th and 28th, I think, were used chiefly because ordinary channels of diplomatic communications weren't operating fast enough—coding, decoding, translating and that sort of thing.

Now, I mean it was just barely possible that events could have gotten out of control there because we had not received that message on October 28, then the next phases of the contingency planning would have had to go into operation fairly quickly because the missile sites were still, so far as we could tell, under construction and operation, and some of them seemed to be in a high state of readiness.

Then, after October 28, the out traffic of weapons and military personnel began.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think it would be very interesting, sometime, Mr. Secretary, if you could indicate what communications media were used during this period of crisis because there has been a good deal of comment about the necessity of a hot line, so to speak, emergency line, between the White House and the Kremlin as we have between the White House or between Kennedy and Macmillan. The whole subject matter of communication and international relations is surely one of primary importance and whether we will ever get by again as luckily as we did this time is questionable.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, we did—could I just go off the record just for a second?

[Discussion off the record.]²

INFORMATION VIA FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Senator AIKEN. Do you suppose there could be some means of prompt communications with members of the Foreign Relations Committee so we won't have to get our information from foreign countries first? About the middle of the day before the President spoke, I was given information as to the contents of his message which came from a Latin American country. I didn't know whether to believe it or not, but it turned out to be accurate. That was several hours before we got it officially here.

Secretary RUSK. There was a meeting of the leadership of Congress that afternoon, five o'clock, I believe it was. I don't believe that this was given to Latin American countries. There must have been a leak. I don't think it was given to them quite as early as that. I understand there was a possible leak in Mexico.

Senator AIKEN. Yes, it was from Mexico. It was quite a few hours, the report was, that it had been given to them, so there would not be too much commotion to prepare them and so they could post their police in their proper places to prevent rioting when the President spoke, but the contents of the President's message were also reported.

² No transcript was made of "off the record" remarks.

Secretary RUSK. I think there was a leak in that particular capital on the contents of the message. What we did with a number of governments earlier in the day was to tell them that the Ambassador would want to see the President of their country at, I think it was two hours before the President's speech, but that he would advise that they consider taking any necessary security measure because of developments were likely to be very serious.

Senator AIKEN. I think that was a very proper course to follow, but it was a little disconcerting to get our information from a foreign country several hours before the President spoke in this country.

Secretary RUSK. I can see that problem, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. I don't criticize the course of action because I think it was necessary.

Secretary RUSK. The problem of consultation with other governments was one that we did think very hard about. It was important for us that there not be a leak of the information without knowledge of what action was being taken. I think the consequences of that could have been very serious right around the world.

Also, we had been talking about Cuba with NATO and with the OAS for a long time. The President had made his September press conference statement solemnly stating that weapons of this sort would be the gravest possible issue and so we took our chance. I am reminded of a question that came up during the Korean War, and I called in the Ambassador of Australia and the Ambassador of New Zealand and put to them the question, I forget now what the question was, and they both said, "Don't ask us that question, give us something to support it."

I think on some of these really vital issues, there are moments when they want to know what you are going to do rather than ask them a question which they are unable to answer really from any satisfactory point of view.

SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CUBA

Well now, the out traffic started with the missiles. If you look at the record in detail you will find that while the missiles were going out we did not say very much about the bombers. But when the missiles were five or six hundred miles offshore we then made an issue of the bombers, when the bombers then got out we have been putting pressures on the out-traffic of further military personnel. There remain on the island perhaps up to 17,000 Soviet military personnel. That is based upon not a count but on a filling out of the table of organization, in effect, of elements that we think are there.

Senator WILLIAMS. How many were there at the peak?

Secretary RUSK. I would think now based on what we think of going out, I would say it might be just over 20,000, but there are quite frankly differences in the intelligence community about the count because some of this is necessarily speculative.

The most serious elements that are there are Russian crews for the surface-to-air antiaircraft missiles and the accompanying radar, and four battalion combat teams, heavily armed, that are located at four different places on the island, which apparently originally

had the mission of protecting the missiles, including protecting them against Cubans, but now seem to be in relation to key centers in the event there are any disturbances on the island.

Now, the Russians have said to us that these additional military elements, organized units, will move out in due course, but although there is some out traffic they are not moving out as fast as the missiles and the bombers did.

So, we are on the one side wanting to see that out traffic continues, but on the other side we are not at the present time content with the rate at which they are moving out.

Senator AIKEN. Are replacements coming in?

Secretary RUSK. So far as we can tell not. The rest of the Soviet personnel that are there are apparently on training missions and supply and support missions for their own units and things of that sort, and communications.

SOVIET MIG'S IN CUBA

Senator SYMINGTON. May I ask a question about this?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. A MIG-21 fighter is an infinitely more dangerous weapon, to us, than an IL-28 bomber. They have, as I understand it, some 40 MIG-21 fighters, and many more MIGs. Why do we just figure those people are only for anti-aircraft defense? Those planes are very hard to maintain, and hard to fly. Why couldn't we think they were keeping some of those Russians in there to handle these offensive weapons they still have on the island?

Secretary RUSK. I think that at the present time, Senator, that there are Russians flying these MIG's. I think in the fly-past on the parade on January 2, that the ratio of Russian pilots to Cuban pilots—

[Discussion off the record.]

CUBA HAS BECOME A SANCTUARY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I have talked this over with the Secretary before, he knows my views on it or my speculation rather than views, I don't know whether they are views or not. But I have raised the question of whether or not Mr. Khrushchev paid anything for this or whether he didn't get full value for what he did and whether this wasn't the most colossal bluff in history because basically, I wonder if Khrushchev and—

The CHAIRMAN. Castro.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And Castro haven't got exactly what they want, a sanctuary now, an assurance that they won't be physically disturbed. What more could they ask? I have never been able to get myself into a position to believe that Khrushchev wanted any part of a shooting war in this hemisphere. He knew he would have a shooting war in Russia if we had a shooting war in this hemisphere. I never have been able to get myself to fully accept the premise that he was preparing for an actual shooting war here, but the net result is maybe a pulling away from Castro in Cuba and leaving him—maybe this is an exaggerated statement but for the sake of emphasis I will make it—in a more or less protected

position now, and what more advance could communism want in this hemisphere—

Secretary RUSK. Senator, may I comment on this?

Senator HICKENLOOPER [continuing]. And a protection or a haven in Cuba with the assurance we are not going to do much to disturb them as long as they don't do overt acts toward other countries.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, let me speak to that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I only ask that question and I talked to you about it.

POINT OF ORDER

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise a point of order. Why don't we let him testify now and let questions be put later and abstain from getting into a discussion of what conclusions the facts justify. It is not a point of order, but I think we could allow him to give his views and then ask questions about matters upon which we can formulate our judgments.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no feeling about it other than the informality of being able to ask questions as he develops a particular point. If the committee wishes we will reserve all questions until he finishes, but I thought it was going on very satisfactorily.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it is a very good idea on how to proceed, but I understood this was an informal discussion; otherwise I usually try to keep still until the fellow has finished his talk.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am not taking exception with what you have done, Bourke, but I think questions ought to be put in to get clarification on something as you go along. I will withdraw my objection.

The CHAIRMAN. I was under the impression that what the Senator was trying to do is to question the assumption of the Secretary in this particular instance that he paid a price.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is all right for me to have the Secretary—

Secretary RUSK. Perhaps I can make some more remarks on Cuba and then perhaps I can pause there before going on to another subject.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

PROBLEM OF INSPECTION IN CUBA

Secretary RUSK. I do want to point out that the Cuban crisis is in no sense over. It continues to be a highly dangerous situation and could flare up in a number of contingencies.

In the first place, without any adequate inspection in Cuba which we consider to be a combination of both ground and air instruction which was U Thant's original proposal to the Cubans, it is necessary for us to continue such overflights as we need, both high level and if necessary low level. Those may get shot at. If they get shot at we will have to take counteraction and this could build the thing up very fast.

We do know that the other side knows about our overflights, and that since November they have not bothered us. This has been thoroughly explained to the Soviet Union, that we will not abandon them and we will have to take whatever action is necessary to enforce the overflight operation.

And tacitly they have been accepting it. They have a capability of firing and shooting at these planes. Thus far, since the loss of our one U-2 at the height of the crisis we have not had our planes shot at or menaced.

Secondly, there is a possibility of events happening on the island while Soviet military personnel are still there.

We know there are tensions on the island. I don't want to exaggerate this because I don't want to seem to be in any sense optimistic about what might happen on the island in the absence of further effort from the outside.

MIKOYAN'S VISIT TO CUBA

But Mikoyan and Castro had a very rough time with each other while he was in Havana.³ There was one period of ten days in which Castro refused to see Mikoyan and finally Mikoyan sent him word at one of Mikoyan's briefings when he got back here to New York. Mikoyan sent him word that unless Castro came to see him he would leave immediately for Moscow and Castro did immediately see him in the final day or two he was there.

It is our belief, we have no hard evidence for it, that the Soviet Union did propose on-site inspection in Cuba and Castro rejected it. I think there is a limit beyond which they could not get complete control over Castro without threatening the complete kind of break which would be the kind of price they would be reluctant to pay. We have had the same sort of problem with some of our friends abroad, the ability to persuade which has a certain limit unless you are prepared to break your entire relationship with a particular country.

But, there is tension between some of the 26 of July revolutionaries still left there and the Communist apparatus. There is tension within the regime among those, some of those, who apparently would like to get rid of both the Castro and Russian influence. There is some flirting with China, Peiping going on in Cuba at the present time.

Now, if there should be any move from any direction of that sort and Russian forces in Cuba start shooting at Cubans then we would have to do something immediately because we do not take this Hungary-type action in this hemisphere.

There is also the possibility of acts against other Latin American countries. Castro's speech showed no retreat on this subject, and acts of that sort would again lead to a further buildup of the situation.

INABILITY TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS

We were not able to come to any agreement with the Soviet Union in these discussions which have been going on in the last two and a half months in New York. The only thing that was possible to do was simply to thank U Thant, tell him that some progress had been made, as was true. There were a number of points at which agreement had not been possible but to suggest that we saw

³ Immediately after the Cuban Missile crisis, Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan made a 24-day visit to Cuba to confer with Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

no present occasion for further consideration by the Security Council.

Now, because of the very point that Senator Hickenlooper raised, we were unable to undertake any commitments that gave up, for example, the overflight right, that seemed to amend in any way the basic responsibilities of the Rio Treaty, that would create a sanctuary in Cuba for action by Castro against other people in Latin America and we could not cut across, as the President's November 20 press conference indicated, the resolutions taken at Punta del Este about the attitude of the hemisphere toward the penetration of the hemisphere by a Marxist-Leninist regime.

Those were issues on which the Soviets charged that we were somehow running out on a commitment that they considered we had made in October 27.

The fact is that that exchange of October 27, 28 was not performed on their side. There was no on-site inspection, there were no assurances about what might happen in the future. That is the present status of the disagreement, the range of disagreement between us and the Soviet Union on this particular subject.

Senator HUMPHREY. I just think it would be very good to make this very plain to people, Mr. Secretary, because this is something that while it has been spread out on the record many times, it has been hit and miss, and the concern that Senator Hickenlooper expressed is not an unusual concern.

NO DILUTION OF THE RIO PACT

In fact, it is prevalent, because I don't think a neat, concise package has been stated of where we stand vis-a-vis the continuation of Castro's regime. What does stand out is that the no-invasion pledge, and Pat [Holt] knows we ran into this again and again in our little visit to South America—

Secretary RUSK. We are consulting with the OAS, we expect to have an OAS meeting shortly of a public sort where this part of it can be thoroughly clarified, because we are fully aware not only of the attitude of our own people but of the hemisphere on this point, and there have been no commitments made that cut in in any way to the basic obligations of the hemisphere under the Rio Pact.

Senator AIKEN. No commitments at all made?

Secretary RUSK. I say—

Senator AIKEN. You say no commitments that would cut in any way?

Secretary RUSK. I mean there has been no dilution of the Rio Pact and that was the thing that was the concern of our Latin—

Senator AIKEN. The no-invasion pledge was a conditional and temporary promise.

Secretary RUSK. That was part of our transaction against a background of solemn treaty and historical arrangements in the hemisphere that in our view were not changed at all.

Senator AIKEN. It certainly didn't mean no invasion under any circumstances.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. Now also, I want to point out that that was directly related to a contingency which was not performed by the other side.

Senator AIKEN. That is on-site inspection.

Secretary RUSK. On-site inspection and assurance of no weapons in the future so there is no contract here on this point.

Senator LAUSCHE. What was it if there is no contract, what was this understanding? What did they promise to do, what did we promise to do?

TEXTS OF THE KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV LETTERS

Secretary RUSK. The understanding is in the exchange of letters of President Kennedy's letter of October 27, and Khrushchev's letter of October 28. Let me say about that, Senator, that—I mean I have the text here and I would be glad to pass them down to you, but the contingencies were included in those letters, but if you look at the October 26 letter which has not been made public and I have indicated I would be glad to show the committee—

The CHAIRMAN. Does the committee wish him to read that letter?

Senator LAUSCHE. I think it is the crux of the whole thing.

Secretary RUSK. The 27th, I don't have the text of the 26th letter with me at the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you get it?

Senator SPARKMAN. There has been more speculation on that letter, more than any other one.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you said you did have it available.

Secretary RUSK. No, I can make it available.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Lausche's question is pertinent. I would like to know what they said they would do and what we said we would do.

The CHAIRMAN. If he has the letter there, read it to us.

You have the 27th letter?

Senator MORSE. The 27th letter, Mr. Chairman, was based upon Khrushchev's letter of the 26th rather than—

Senator LAUSCHE. So then you have got to have both to understand it.

The CHAIRMAN. It would contain whatever commitments we had made, if any, in response to his letter.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, but it says, "In accordance with what you said in the letter of the 26th," and refers to that letter in several instances, if I remember correctly.

Secretary RUSK. Just give me a moment, Mr. Chairman, and I will find it.

Let me say that I think if you look at the text of the October 26th letter, the President's public letter of October 27 and Khrushchev's reply of October 28, also public, a lawyer could never find a contract in those letters. We exploited the October 26th letter for more than it was worth in our public reply of the 27th, but we did so because we wanted to ignore the October 27th letter from Khrushchev about Turkey and Italy and so forth.

PRECISE CONDITIONS IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER

Further, the precise conditions set forth in President Kennedy's public letter of October 27 were not picked up precisely by Mr. Khrushchev in his public letter of October 28. So that this could

not stand up to the inspection of contract law. This came up, for example, when the issue of the bombers came up.

Senator HUMPHREY. I recall.

Secretary RUSK. There was considerable discussion during one period whether bombers had in fact been included. We insisted they were included.

Senator HUMPHREY. Even though they had not been directly mentioned.

Secretary RUSK. Not in every instance. They were mentioned in the President's October 22 speech, you see.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. And Mr. Khrushchev had referred to weapons "which you considered to be offensive."

Now, I suspect what he meant by that from his point of view was that he was not willing to put that label on himself. He was assigning to us that label "that you call offensive" but we weren't going to miss the chance to say that "You said you were going to take out the weapons that we call offensive and we call these bombers offensive."

So these transactions did not stand up to, they were not meticulously negotiated precise views. These were transactions in a fast-moving exchange where events might have taken over at any moment.

Senator CHURCH. May I ask there, Mr. Secretary, about the letters themselves?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. Were they actually delivered in letter form? I was at the U.N. on the 27th, and at that time the only text that the mission had there to work on was a Reuters dispatch which contained contents of a letter that hadn't then been located or at least it was not known in New York that it had actually been delivered to the President.

Secretary RUSK. The exchanges were based on the public texts, but the official text came along in due course. In other words, we didn't get the actual text from the Russians other than their broadcast message until the whole thing was practically over, just as a matter of transmission.

THE FIGHTER QUESTION

Senator SYMINGTON. Could I ask this question on the wording?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. "Weapons you consider offensive." Everybody knows bombers are offensive. Everybody knows a missile is offensive unless it is a defensive ground-to-air missile. Might that not have been clever terminology to evade the fighter question?

Secretary RUSK. The fighter question, Senator, to be completely candid, was—we would like, of course, to see these fighters out of there. We had accepted in September the configuration of these fighter aircraft as a part of a defensive configuration.

In retrospect it is just possible that had we specifically included the fighters those could have been gotten out. But when we were on October 22 deciding what to make an issue, if necessary, of nuclear war, it seemed to us we had to concentrate on the offensive

weapons that created a serious threat to this country and to the hemisphere. I perhaps could regret now that we didn't include them at the time, but at that time the question was how much would the traffic bear, how much would the traffic bear in terms of what had to be done.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have seen scores of our fighters in Turkey [deleted].

A fighter can be infinitely much more of an offensive danger than old and slow bombers.

Secretary RUSK. I will mention this, but with the assurance that given our experience we don't value it more than it is worth, the Soviets have given us again the most categorical statement that there are no longer any nuclear weapons in Cuba. We have had a categorical statement before about what was in Cuba, so we are fully aware of that. We are not under any illusion on that. But that is at least part of the picture.

KHRUSHCHEV'S ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask which of the documents do you claim sets forth the commitments which we made, whether legal or merely having the semblance of legality. Is it the letter of October 27?

Secretary RUSK. The October 27 letter, with its contingencies, that is the provisos there, but again we would, and we have insisted that this was a precise transaction of that time and does not in any way change the whole structure of international relations in the organization of the hemisphere for an indefinite future.

In other words, this was a transaction, not a—

Senator LAUSCHE. Then Khrushchev's statements and the statements carried in the papers of Russia that we committed ourselves not to make an invasion constitute an erroneous interpretation of what we promised.

Secretary RUSK. Stated in those categorical terms, that is correct. I might say this, Senator—

Senator LAUSCHE. May I read what it says here?

Secretary RUSK. All right.

Senator LAUSCHE. "Which seem generally acceptable," this is the letter of October 27, and I think it is—

Senator SYMINGTON. From whom to whom?

Senator LAUSCHE. From President Kennedy to Mr. Khrushchev. He gets down into the letter and he says:

As I read your letter—

That is Khrushchev's letter—

The key elements of your proposal which seem generally acceptable, as I understand them, are as follows:

1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision, and undertake with suitable safeguards to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

2. We, on our part, would agree upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba, and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

Now, are there any other further specific commitments than these two?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. That assurance on invasion of Cuba related, did it not, to the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the possibility of our invasion was very imminent, providing that these weapons systems were not promptly removed?

KHRUSHCHEV PRESENTS HIMSELF AS A PEACEMAKER

Secretary RUSK. It also, I think, in terms of what the Soviets say about it, is related to the fact that Khrushchev, from his point of view, had to say something about why he was taking them out, and his theory of the case was that he is taking them out because they had performed their mission of protecting Cuba against an imminent invasion.

This was nonsense as far as what the plans were.

Senator AIKEN. Not imminent invasion because when those missiles went in there the invasion wasn't imminent.

Secretary RUSK. That is right. But I mean that was the theory of the case that he needed to get the missiles out, then this was the one that he used and he came forward as the great peacemaker, you will recall.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Well, we wanted to get the missiles out. But what it was we said to them for the last two and a half months is that this language cannot in any circumstance move in on the treaty arrangements in this hemisphere. We included all the treaties including Guantanamo, and they were unwilling to recognize the continuing validity of these treaty arrangements in any public or formal way, therefore, there was no agreement, you see. I mean that was the key issue on which these discussions broke down.

NO-INVASION PLEDGE

Senator HUMPHREY. I think the point that the public raises or that is raised in public, have we made a commitment that we will never invade Cuba—

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is the point in simple language, as you have given, is to give assurance or some assurance that some people want. As I understand it, the no-invasion pledge was related to the provisos and conditions contained in this rather personal document, and also to the fact that these conditions were not fulfilled in light of inspection not being granted that even that pledge, the document of October 27, is no longer valid.

Secretary RUSK. I might draw the committee's attention to a paragraph in the President's November 20 press conference:

I repeat we would like nothing better than adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and verification in Cuba, and we are prepared to continue our efforts to achieve such arrangements.

He had just gotten through saying we had to continue otherwise.

Until that is done, difficult problems remain. As for our part, if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguard, and if Cuba is not used for the export of

aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And as I said in September, we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.

He continued:

We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island.

In other words, it was the military invasion of the island under those circumstances that was being talked about at this this time.

THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF CASTRO

Senator HUMPHREY. I think it would still be very helpful if there could be somewhere along the line a coordinated, concise, statement of U.S. policy vis-a-vis Cuba, because it surely is one that is in a rather nebulous state.

One gentleman the other night told some of us that he considered the real menace of Castro today was not really subversion, not really the possibility of attack upon Latin American countries, but the very fact of his presence and continuing presence as a way of telling other potential Castroites in other Latin American countries that "You can last it out, you are not liquidated, you are not removed, you can last it out."

In other words, the longevity of Castro in Cuba is an inspiration to the activity, and the accession to power of potential Castroites in other countries. Now, that is just a statement of a man who has responsibility in a new country or another country.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that has been made abundantly clear by a number of countries and a number of people in a number of countries, I have heard it a number of times, that is the great danger.

ON-SITE INSPECTION

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, as long as we are discussing this letter, I am not entirely clear.

A question asked me on a telecast program back home was, had we agreed not to invade Cuba. I said no, we hadn't. This was the information I got from the newspapers, the only information I had, that we had specified on-site inspection; and that inasmuch as we had not been granted on-site inspection, any agreement not to invade was cancelled out. But there is nothing in this letter which stipulates there must be on-site inspection.

Secretary RUSK. I think the paragraph that has the reference to invasion in it begins that way, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. But it doesn't say we want on-site inspection, I mean they might say—

Secretary RUSK. Would you just let me see it?

"We on our part would agree upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to assure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments," that language was to include on-site inspection.

Senator HUMPHREY. Which we specified.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. But we had better find out where we stand. Do we say we are not bound by the promise not to invade because they didn't carry out their commitment or are they not bound because we never committed ourselves not to invade?

Secretary RUSK. We never made an unadorned commitment not to invade Cuba in the first place. In the second place a crucial element on the conditions that we then talked about specifically have not been performed, has not been performed by the other side. So both elements apply, Senator.

QUALIFICATIONS TO THE NO-INVASION PLEDGE

Senator LAUSCHE. Just this: Is it the contention of our government now that this promise to invade was applicable only to this ad hoc emergency that existed, and was not applicable to the future?

Secretary RUSK. It is not applicable in the presence of a wholly new situation. I mean, for example, I cited two cases as instances: One, if Russian troops in Cuba start shooting at Cubans a la Hungary to impose or to defend one particular kind of regime rather than another, we have said that to the Russians.

They understand this is a qualification of the sort that we were talking about when we were talking about the Rio Treaty.

Second, if, as a result of our necessity for over-flying, the situation moves into a point where we have to invade this could develop out of a contingency. I mentioned those two, there may be others.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is our interpretation. That is not the product of talks that you have had with them?

Secretary RUSK. Well, this is our interpretation but we have said that to them and that is the principal reason why we were unwilling to accept the only kind of language that we could use which would make reservations on all these points, you see.

NOT A BINDING CONTRACT

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, pending the arrival of the letter of the 26th, which I think would be basic to any analysis of what agreement was entered into, I think on the basis of what the Secretary has said we musn't overlook the elements of an agreement, the offer, the consideration and the acceptance.

Of course, our offer is based upon the contents of the letter of the 26th. My understanding of this discussion, and the Secretary will tell me if I am wrong, is that we made an offer of no invasion on the basis of the conditions that then existed provided there was a certain conformance on the part of Russia in respect to the nuclear weapons that we insisted come out.

We also offered that the policing of it or the administering of it would be through the United Nations under suitable conditions that we subsequently were free to approve or reject. I think that is all part of this contract or agreement, and unless there is something in the October 26th letter that is at great variance from what the Secretary has told us is in there, I am sure it will be as he has represented it. It seems to me that we made no offer for an agreement separate and distinct from the then existing conditions. It has nothing to do with the future or of new conditions that could arise

and I happen to think are arising in Cuba, but we will go into that later at another session.

What I see from this discussion this morning are no elements of a contract binding on us in future or separate from the conditions that existed at the time the so-called offers and acceptance were made by Kennedy and Khrushchev.

LETTER NOT MADE PUBLIC

Secretary RUSK. Senator, you will find when I get the text of the October 26 letter, and by the way, let me say that we would appreciate it very much if the committee would not make that letter public. The only reason for that is from our point of view the Soviet Union does not wish to make it public and we wish to conform to amenities of diplomatic exchange because it is their privilege to decide just as it is our privilege to decide on other matters. For reasons of their own they don't want to make it public but you will find in that letter that we stretched the October 26th letter of Khrushchev's perhaps far beyond its actual language in our reply of October 27. You will not find there the kind of language that we put into our letter of October 27, although reference was made to their letter of the 26th.

One of the reasons why we referred to their letter of the 26th was we wanted to get away from their letter of the 27th from Khrushchev about Italy and Turkey and the NATO bases and so forth. We feel we had a much stronger case in the Security Council or in the General Assembly or in the OAS or in NATO about what we said in the 27th than we would have before the International Court of Justice in terms of any contract.

Senator HUMPHREY. Any Senator ought to understand that, because sometimes when we are asked a question on telecasts and so forth we say, "Thank you for that question," and then proceed to go off on a subject matter that we are more interested in, and is not as embarrassing as a proper answer to the question would be. In other words, the art of diplomacy isn't a monopoly of the State Department in negotiations with Khrushchev.

WHAT OUR EXACT POSITION IS

Senator LAUSCHE. I do think we ought to get ourselves clear on what our exact positions is: One, do we confess we committed ourselves not to invade, but that commitment became illegal because of a breach of contract on the part of the Soviet, that is, a confession and avoidance?

Two, do we deny that we at any time made a promise not to invade? Now, that cannot be both. It has got to be one or the other.

Senator MORSE. I think there is a third avenue that we haven't sufficiently approached, and I will keep still with this.

We made an offer, and I don't think our offer was ever accepted because our offer was based upon certain conditions precedent being complied with by Khrushchev. He never complied with them and I think the International Court of Justice would find that there was no binding commitment that was made until there had been a performance.

Senator LAUSCHE. That would mean that there never was a contract made. But I am talking about admitting we made a contract, and the contract being voided because of a breach, that is what you contended in our telecast, as I understand it.

Senator MORSE. We only admit that we made an offer.

Secretary RUSK. The basic problem is that of the most overriding political and strategic considerations in relation between the Soviet Union and the free world. It is partly legal in character but not fully legal in character. It is only partly. One of the most important elements in the legal position, and indeed in the constitutional position inside this country, is the Rio Treaty.

Senator LAUSCHE. It the Rio Treaty mentioned in any of the letters?

Secretary RUSK. We offered to the Soviets in the course of the discussions in New York language which put in all the reservations, including existing treaty arrangements. We used all treaty arrangements rather than the Rio Treaty because we wanted to include the Guantanamo Treaty, for example, but the Rio Treaty itself, was not by name mentioned in this particular exchange of communications, although it was mentioned by reference in other communications in other public statements since then.

CONDITIONS WHICH MIGHT JUSTIFY AN INVASION

Senator WILLIAMS. Suppose Russia was to pull out these fighters and her personnel, would we then be obligated to live up to our pledge of no invasion?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, if Castro committed aggressive acts, if Castro were to do the kind of things which would from our point of view justify invasion. I mean when we talk about invasion, gentlemen, we are talking about a large scale military operation involving many American casualties and the estimate has been up to 30 or 40 or 50 thousand Cuban casualties. In other words, this is not a weekend operation. This is a very serious matter, and it would be undertaken only for the most serious reasons. These serious reasons involve considerations under the Rio Treaty, the aggressive character of the regime, some other factor which are fully included in the reservations we have expressed on the whole subject.

Senator WILLIAMS. Do we understand, if Russia had completed all of the requests which we made that they carry out, our suggestion that there would be no invasion was made with no intention on our part to carry it out?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, before October 14 we had no intention of invading Cuba. Under the Rio Treaty there was always a possibility that circumstances could develop where we might invade Cuba or if there was an attack on Guantanamo we almost certainly would move our troops into Cuba at that point. But there was never an unreserved commitment regardless of circumstances not to invade Cuba.

Senator WILLIAMS. But we understand that in the event of an attack on Guantanamo or attack elsewhere, but in the absence of an attack or aggression militarily from Cuba would we be bound that there would be no invasion?

Secretary RUSK. I don't think that question is so much a question of our being bound because I think in that sense we would be bound anyhow under U.N. charter, OAS treaties not to launch an invasion except for a thoroughly justifiable purpose. I think what would restrain us in that situation would be for what does the United States invade Cuba.

Senator WILLIAMS. We don't accept the premise, as I understand it, that the original invasion of the Bay of Pigs was a violation of the United Nations charter or agreement and would we have a right repeat that if we wanted to?

The CHAIRMAN. That was a covert operation. [Laughter.]

That was not an official operation. That was one reason they tried to make it covert is because on overt one would have been in violation.

Senator WILLIAMS. I think we would do a good job in getting some of these offensive weapons out. But what is disturbing me is maybe there is some indication that we weren't so sincere on our part that we would live up to our obligations if Russia lived up to her obligations.

Secretary RUSK. Let me mention another—

Senator WILLIAMS. I don't say they did, but if she did.

Secretary RUSK. Let me mention another contingency that we would not consider interfered with her in this situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

PLACING OF MISSILES IN CUBA

Senator AIKEN. How did the long range missiles get into Cuba?

Secretary RUSK. They apparently came in the holds of wide hatched ships. I must say that they laid this on as a very expert technical job, looking back at the pace at which they actually put them into position and what was required. They brought in prefabricated coverings for the cables running from the radar station to the actual pads. All of their housing was brought in prefabricated. All the vehicles, the refueling vehicles, the fueling vehicles, and the power generators, certain kinds of fencing around the area, were all brought in and laid on, I would suppose, in about a three-week period.

It was a fantastic logistic job of pre-planning, and this means that somewhere back in the late spring they would have had to have made the decision to do this.

Senator AIKEN. Did the Army or any other branch of the armed services ever indicate a suspicion or a belief or information to the effect that this strong military build-up was going on, we will say, from April 1st until October 1st?

Secretary RUSK. I think the military build-up reached Cuba beginning about July 1st, that is, the significant military build-up of the surface-to-air missiles. The Comar type motor torpedo boats, the MIG's came in from the period July until—

Senator AIKEN. Wasn't there strong suspicion as early as late March or April of an exceptional number of boats moving in?

Secretary RUSK. There had been early artillery tanks and things of that sort, and a considerable number of technicians going in during that period to be there for training purposes.

Senator AIKEN. And you had full coordination among the Army, CIA and all other military branches?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that it might be that the committee or subcommittee might want to go through this scenario in great detail to see how this developed, what the sources of information were, what the information was at a particular time, what steps were taken to try to confirm the reports that came in, and I think that would be a matter of considerable interest to the committee, and we would be very happy to go through it.

Senator AIKEN. I think we might want, Mr. Chairman, to get some information from the branches of the armed services, intelligence, on what they were thinking last spring.

SUSPICIONS WITHOUT REAL EVIDENCE

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, wasn't it true that there were some people as far back as August who felt very definitely they would not go to the site expense and development unless they were putting up offensive weapons?

Secretary RUSK. I know of one who thought so, despite the fact that he could not put his finger on anything very tangible. He could not put his finger on anything very specific, but he made the judgment, and it turned out to be right, that they would not go to this enormous expense unless it were for something worth more than the conventional defense of the island. But at the time that he expressed this, he said, "I can't base this on any real evidence."

This was similar to another judgment that got me into a little bit of trouble during the summer. I had been saying that I thought the Berlin situation was going to get to be very serious in the autumn, in the late autumn. This was more osmosis than anything else.

Some of my own colleagues, when asked about this by the press, couldn't offer them any evidence. Our allies were a little disturbed that out of Washington was coming a view that the Berlin situation was going to get more serious, but they didn't know why.

But there was something in the atmosphere, and this man made the judgment to which I just referred. My antennae picked up that things were going to get tougher, but I had no evidence for it. Then you get another situation, Senator, that you are familiar with in background, when thousands and thousands of pieces of information come in from all over the place, from all kinds of sources of different classifications—getting this properly analyzed and the real possibilities up to the top policy echelons is a major problem.

You remember the time of the Korean affair, that after the North Korean attack started, it was possible then to go back and find six or eight or ten bits of intelligence that would have pointed in that direction. But the weekend of the Korean attack the Director of Intelligence in Korea was on vacation, the general was over in Japan; the headquarters in Tokyo thought that this attack at the beginning was simply another border incident. No one picked up the phone then and telephoned the Assistant Secretary for Far

East that we are expecting an attack, you see. Afterwards, you could find out which bits were right.

Now, it was not until we had what seemed to be direct suspicious information pointing to a specific location involving construction of a suspicious character that the policy people had this brought to their attention. We authorized the overflights to take a look at that precise situation, and this opened up—I mean the intelligence community and all of them down the line have an enormous problem in what to raise and what time as a flag on the situation.

We are examining that very carefully to see if we cannot find ways so that maybe when conclusions are drawn on an intelligence judgment, that at least some sampling adverse indicators be noted in the margin so that the policy people will know that maybe this is not just the full story, and that we had better be just a little reserved about what could develop. But this is a terribly difficult problem when you are getting thousands and thousands of pieces of intelligence every day.

FURTHER BRIEFINGS BY THE SECRETARY

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you could give me information as to what your plans for a further briefing by the Secretary are? I apologize, but I have to go for a very important conference I have now, and we have not gotten over Cuba yet, and we certainly need briefing on some other subjects, particularly, may I say, Mr. Secretary, on France.

I understand de Gaulle is supposedly planning to make a major speech this coming Monday which, if its contents are what I have been advised will be part of it, I think would be alarming, and I think it is very important, Mr. Chairman, that we get together with the Secretary next week for a discussion of some of these European problems, including Berlin and NATO. I want to say good naturedly, in my campaign the issue was raised over and over again that I talked too much in the Senate. I assured the people in my State that if they re-elected me, I would talk more in this session than the last because there was so much more to be said.

Senator HUMPHREY. He said that in jest. [Laughter.]

Senator MORSE. And one of my first offerings will be next week in regard to U.S. relations with France. I would like to be advised by the Department of State before I make that speech, which I hold in my hand, because I think we ought to know about our relations with NATO, what they are going to be and how much more we are going to be expected to pay through the nose. But I cannot stay. I was going to raise some of these questions this morning if we got to France.

I would like to have a briefing with the Secretary of State next week, and I would like to have the October 26 letter put in your possession, Mr. Chairman, so that we can read it in the committee room, either this week or the first of next.

So whatever arrangements you work out I would like to know about before I make this first—keep this pledge that I made starting next week.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I would greatly welcome a chance to come back at the earliest opportunity because, as the committee has observed, we have not begun to cover the ground.

The CHAIRMAN. No. We have a lot of things to go into.

Senator HUMPHREY. India.

Secretary RUSK. I could do it any time—I am seeing the House committee on Monday afternoon, but otherwise my schedule is at your disposal.

The CHAIRMAN. The staff will get in touch with you Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday morning, whenever it is convenient, just as soon as you are able to make it.

SOVIETS IN CUBA

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, may I just ask a departing question. You said at peak strength you estimated 20,000 Russians were in Cuba. What is your present estimate?

Secretary RUSK. Based upon a certain amount of counting and estimating what would be the situation if the tables of organization would be at full strength, there is a rough estimate of up to 17,000.

Senator CHURCH. Who are still there?

Secretary RUSK. About that amount. We do know that on a pretty close count that at least 4,000 have gone out, and that the out traffic does continue, but not at the pace we would like to see.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you.

Secretary RUSK. This figure was used in a press story this morning, I believe, or yesterday. It looks fairly accurate from our point of view. But it does have that speculative element in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to continue with Cuba or do you want a very few brief comments about some of these other situations, and then continue this later or do you wish to continue with Cuba?

Senator SPARKMAN. I would like to ask just one question.

Senator AIKEN. I think the other items might take as long as Cuba.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought just to give a brief evaluation of the Congo and just in a few words do that or do you wish to—

RANSOM OF PRISONERS

Senator WILLIAMS. I would like to ask one question. To what extent did the United States Government put up anything or equipment toward this ransom of prisoners?

Secretary RUSK. To my knowledge, Senator, I think there was some release to the Red Cross of some food from the CCC if needed. But whether that has actually been presented I do not know. I will try to get the details on it, but I have not caught up on it since I came back after New Year's—but the medicines and foodstuffs and cash were raised by private contribution.

The CHAIRMAN. No government cash?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. What about tax adjustments such as eligibility for deduction purposes?

Secretary RUSK. The Families Committee and, indeed, the Red Cross, had much earlier received the tax exemption privilege for contributions.

The CHAIRMAN. Which committee?

Secretary RUSK. The Families Committee, the prisoners Families Committee.

Senator HUMPHREY. That was under that old tractor deal.

Secretary RUSK. It was done at the time that question originally came up. Looking at it in one sense, that itself involves governmental participation. But I point out that the American people come up with about \$8 billion a year for all sorts of charitable, educational and similar purposes on the same basis. The same rules were applied here as were applied to other situations.

I realize, Mr. Chairman, that this problem has some very disagreeable aspects, and it is on balance a kind of judgment as to what ought to be done in all of the circumstances. But I must say that I feel better that those prisoners are out of Cuban jails; that we do not have that problem overhanging us in our future relations with Cuba.

USE OF FEDERAL FUNDS

Senator WILLIAMS. The reason I asked the question is I have seen statements made that there were no Federal funds involved, and I understand that there were Federal funds involved. The contribution of food certainly costs Federal money, and whether you put up the food or whether you put up funds is immaterial, and I want to be frank about it, and if it is true, why not just admit it?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I would have to verify whether a certain amount of food which had been earmarked by CCC was, in fact, called for, because the hope was that the Families Committee would raise the necessary funds to handle this on a purely private transaction basis.

Senator WILLIAMS. The fact that the pledge was made so far as the government is concerned, that we would furnish a portion of it.

Secretary RUSK. On a purely standby basis.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Secretary who has full information as to any Federal money that might have gone into this thing and, if so, what Federal money, what food went into this program, what medicines and the specific details of the type, kind and amounts of medicines that went in. Who would have that information so that we do not have to get somebody over here who will say, "Well, my uncle knows that," or "somebody over in some other department knows," and then we will have to send for him, this, that or the other. Is there anybody who knows so that we can get the fountainhead of complete information and so the questions can be answered?

Secretary RUSK. I think I know there is someone who does know the full picture. I will check to see.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not care to pursue it today.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But there will come a time very soon when I think those complete details have to be fully explored, the types of medicine, the kinds of medicines, amounts.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What it was, and so on. There are some very disquieting rumors going around about the types and kinds of drugs and medicines, and so on. I think, at least from my standpoint, they have to be explored.

Secretary RUSK. I will be glad, Mr. Chairman, to tell Mr. Marcy about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else on Cuba?

THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISOLATION OF CUBA

Senator CARLSON. I have one question. I think the Secretary has been very candid and has given us a very good report on the past. But what is our future on Cuba? What does he have in mind as to the administration's program or the Secretary of State's program in regard to the situation with which we are all familiar?

Secretary RUSK. The most immediate point that we have in mind, two points that we have in mind, are, we do feel we must continue the economic and political isolation of Cuba in any event. That involves the OAS. It involves NATO countries, and it chiefly refers to shipping and trade matters.

In the case of shipping there has been a very sharp reduction in free world shipping into Cuba trade. We still have a few ships from Britain, Norway and Greece, and we are trying to work that out with those governments to get those ships out of the Cuba trade. There is no shipping from Latin America into the Cuba trade at the present time, according to my information.

We are also applying Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act—that has to do with refusing assistance to any country who permits their ships to carry assistance to Cuba.

Now, this involves two difficulties: What does "permit" mean? In the case of a government where there is a flagship that has been under, say, a three or four-year time charter to the Soviet bloc, and there is not the same physical control over it that you might have under a voyage charter, for example. Also, how do you know whether a ship is carrying assistance?

We are taking the view that a ship in the trade presumptively is carrying assistance as far as policy is concerned. We would like to work it out so that the ships just are not there, and you did not have to get into the question of what it is carrying.

The most difficult problem there is Greece. I think there are three or four ships on a long-time charter from minor Greek companies, and there are at the moment no legal weapons in the hands of the Greek Government that they can use to get these ships out of the trade, and yet Greece is one of the staunchest of our NATO allies. An immediate and vigorous application of Section 107 to them would be a very serious thing indeed. I talked to the Greek Foreign Minister about it at NATO, and our Ambassador is talking about it in Athens, and we are trying to get to those ships so that Section 107 does not apply.

Senator CARLSON. In other words, our government intends to keep economic pressures, at least, on Cuba?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. And, secondly, Senator, there is another element here in terms of timing and the exact techniques used.

We would like to see, if this out traffic of Soviet military personnel continues, if it is to continue, we would like to keep that out traffic going, so in terms of what is said or done in any particular moment we have to think of it in terms of whether that interferes with the very out traffic that we want to promote. So I think there is a little problem of timing here about exactly how we move at a particular point.

Senator CARLSON. I think we are all in accord that we are hopeful that something will develop down there, and that economic pressure will bring it on.

FOOD TO CUBA

We are in this situation as I see it. We are going to give them this \$53 million worth of medicines and food, and I am not critical of it because I think it is a humanitarian program, but it will be continuing to pour in there for the next year or two. It is not over yet.

Secondly, the United Nations is about to give them \$1,200,000, through the Food and Agriculture Organization.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am glad you brought that up. It has nothing to do with the prisoners.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are we going to be put in the position of supplying our own taxpayers' money for the furnishing of food to Cuba?

Secretary RUSK. We objected as late as yesterday to their going ahead with that. We think we have got it put off for at least six months. But they know very definitely both in the Special Fund and in the FAO we oppose it. We are not taking an acquiescent view toward it.

They have said to us that no U.S. resources would be used if they go ahead with it. But we have said in a situation where it is so easy to sidestep your books, there is not a decisive attitude at all.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Which water came out of the well. [Laughter.]

Secretary RUSK. That is right. But I would appreciate it if this were not made public at the moment, because Paul Hoffman has a problem on his hands in dealing with all the people who are pushing him in the other direction. But we think we have this put off for at least another six months.

Senator HUMPHREY. Does the Soviet contribute to the U.N. Special Fund?

Secretary RUSK. I do not know, Senator, quite frankly. I would have to check that.

Senator HUMPHREY. What I am getting at, these are multilateral organizations, and once in a while I imagine there may be some Russian money, even though it is very modest, that is in a particular project or fund that goes to even Nationalist China.

Secretary RUSK. Soviet jeeps, for example, went into Cuba in connection with a WHO project.

Some governments make contributions in kind just as we do in food, so some of these international funds, and there are some Soviet contributions in some places—but I would have to check to see about the Special Fund.

CONTACTS WITHIN CUBA

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, on this matter that Senator Carlson brings up, what our policy is for the future which, of course, is a long discussion within itself, and which many of us will want to at least contribute to in a small measure, what are the contact within Cuba to work with the dissident elements to bring about some real difficulty to the existing Cuban Government? I predicate the question upon the fact that if we continue our economic pressure, we will continue the political pressure through our allies and friends in OAS or what have you, but there has to be something done inside the country. I heard a good deal about the fact that there were dissident elements that were in very key positions. In fact, even within recent weeks, at least one key person left the country.

Secretary RUSK. Could we have reference to any individual left off the record?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. May we go off the record?

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if we couldn't spend the next 20 minutes on a very brief discussion about what the present situation is in the Congo.

Senator LAUSCHE. I do understand, Mr. Chairman, that we will have a further hearing on Cuba?

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. We will have two or three, but it would be set by the Secretary either Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday morning, depending on the time.

CHANGING SITUATION IN THE CONGO

Could you give us a few words about Tshombe.⁴ We read in the paper he has given in and all that.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, on this Congo, I want to say, not just in humor, that I could say something here and walk out, and we will all find tickers that would cut right across what I have said, because that situation has been changing so rapidly in the last few days.

It has been very hard in the Congo to find certain elements of reality to which you could hang on, because it was a country that became independent prematurely without any preparation. But I would like to just mention the following elements, if I might. The Central Government in the past year and a quarter has done rather well in the rest of the Congo. It did succeed in removing the secessionist leftist regime in Stanleyville, where the Iron Curtain countries had their diplomatic representatives.

The CHAIRMAN. What has happened to Gizenga?⁵

⁴ Moïse Tshombe, President of the secessionist Katanga Province of the Republic of the Congo.
⁵ Antoine Gizenga, former vice premier of the Congo, was imprisoned in 1962.